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'FOREWORD
 
This report - Space 'Augmentationof Military High Level Waste Disposal ­
summarizes the results of the second phase of a research project conducted by
 
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory for the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis­
tration (NASA). The first phase of this project resulted in publication of a
 
report entitled "A Comparative Assessment of Terrestrial High Level Waste
 
Disposal Options." The second phase of this research project focused on the
 
technological, environmental and institutional limiting factors associated with
 
space disposal of selected components of military high level waste. The re­
maining components of the waste are assumed to be disposed of on Earth.
 
The work was funded by NASA's Office of Energy Programs under contract
 
NAS7-100. The contract technical director for NASA was Philip Compton.
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ABSTRACT
 
Space disposal of selected components of military high-level waste
 
(HLW) appears to be possible by approximately the year 2,000. This disposal
 
option offers the promise of eliminating the long-lived radionuclides in mili­
tary HLW from the Earth.
 
Chapter I of this report examines the rational for using space dispo­
sal for some HLW components. Chapter 2 examines the scope and nature of the
 
present and projected military HLW disposal problem. A description of the
 
0.86 	AU heliocentric nuclear waste disposal orbit option is presented, and
 
some features of the safety requirements for this option are discussed. Chap­
ter 3 presents a description of the interaction among EPA, DOE, NASA, NRC, the
 
Congress and the President associated with the space disposal program.
 
In this study we have reached the following conclusions:
 
1. 	 Since most high-level military waste is highly alkaline, and
 
the radionuclides are extremely dilute, currently available
 
chemical separation processes are inadequate for the space
 
disposal option. Because of the payload capacity of the Space
 
Shuttle, the concentration of actinides and/or major fission pro­
ducts from currently available processes for the chemical separa­
tion must be increased by one to two orders of magnitude in order
 
to make space disposal a viable option for military waste.
 
2. 	 A space mission which meets the dual requirements of long-term
 
orbital stability (106 years), and a maximum of one Space Shuttle
 
launch per week over a period of 20-40 years, is a heliocentric
 
orbit about halfway between the orbits of Earth and Venus
 
(0.86 AU). Examination of the mission scenario shows that some
 
phases can be accomplished with existing technology or technology
 
currently under development. Other phases would require the
 
development of new systems. For example an Orbit Transfer Vehicle
 
must be developed to take the pyload from LEO to heliocentric
 
orbit. Similarly, the developmhnt of a storable propellant stage
 
is required in order to circularize the orbit of the payload
 
around the sun.
 
3. 	 Space disposal of high-level radioactive waste is characterized by
 
long-term predictability and short-term uncertainties or "risks".
 
An examination of the mission scenario shows that the risks
 
associated with the following possible events must be reduced to
 
acceptably low levels:
 
(a) 	Catastrophic event at the launch pad.
 
(b) 	Shuttle abort during either boost or LEO insertion
 
phases.
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(c) 	OTV failures during operations with nuclear waste
 
package in LEO.
 
(d) 	OTV failure after leaving LEO.
 
(e) 	Storable propellant stage failure at perihelion.
 
4. 	 Events 3(d) and 3(e) would leave the nuclear waste package in
 
an unplanned and potentially unstable orbit. Since potential
 
Earth reencounter and subsequent burn-up in the Earth's atmos­
phere is unacceptable, a deep-space rendezvous, docking and
 
retrieval capability must be developed.
 
5. 	 With a launch rate of one Shuttle per week, or one payload every
 
two weeks, about a dozen simultaneous payloads need to be tracked
 
in deep space.
 
6. 	 Because of the complexity and the timing of major parallel'
 
activities in the space disposal option, extensive cooperation
 
is required between DOE, NASA, EPA and NRC.
 
7. 	 An examination of all major agency and technology interfaces
 
shows that it may be feasible to begin operation of a space
 
disposal system for selected components of military HLW by the
 
year 2,000.
 
8. 	 In order to enhance public acceptability of the space disposal
 
option, NRC construction and operating licenses are recommended
 
for major space disposal system components.
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CHAPTER I
 
INTRODUCTION
 
High-level nuclear waste is produced from both military application (such
 
as nuclear weapons and nuclear submarines) and civilian nuclear power plants.
 
The toxicity associated with this waste is extremely large and remains so for
 
periods of time which are very long in terms of any time period associated with
 
institutional controls. Based on the projected cumulative quantities of HLW
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in the U.S. by the year 2,000, Blomeke and Bond1 calculate that 5.2 x 1016 m

of water would be required to dilute the HLW to the levels specified in
 
Radiation Concentration Guides (RCG). According to USGS2 "...this volume is
 
almost double that of fresh water in global storage in lakes, rivers, ground
 
water and glaciers. Even after a million years, the volume of water needed to
 
dilute these wastes to the levels specified in the RCG is significant in terms
 
of water stored in individual major lakes and aquifers." Hence, there is an
 
urgent need to determine a method for disposing of HLW in a manner which is
 
safe for a time period on the order of a million years. This unprecedented
 
systems design and verification requirement imposes severe demands on the
 
skills, abilities and imagination of the scientific and technical community.
 
Nevertheless, many options for disposing of HLW have been suggested and par­
tially studied.
 
1.1 HLW DISPOSAL OPTIONS
 
In the United States, the principal.programmatic efforts have been
 
directed at examining the option of disposal of HLW in bedded salt3 ,4 . The
 
U.S. has also engaged in a study program of HLW disposal in the sea-bed.
 
Smaller study efforts have examined "ultimate disposal"-techniques such as
 
transmuting long-lived radionuclides into relatively short-lived radionuclides
 
and disposal of the waste in space. The Swedish nuclear industry has examined
 
the feasibility of HLW disposal in granite5 ,6 . Options such as storing the
 
waste on the polar caps appear to be ruled out due to uncertainties in clima­
tology. Each of these terrestrial disposal options has significant scientific
 
and regulatory uncertainties7;8,9,1 0 . A combination of programmatic difficul­
ties, scientific uncertainties and significant lack of public acceptance has
 
caused previous U.S. plans for disposal of HLW to be modified. The Secretary
 
of DOE was scheduled to submit a new nuclear waste management plan to President
 
Carter on October 1, 1978. This plan was delayed until March 1979. This plan
 
could have a significant impact on the public acceptability of nuclear waste
 
disposal sites. According to the Wall Street Journal:1 1
 
"So far, 11 states have barred a nuclear waste repository within
 
their borders and 15 more are considering such bans.. .The future of
 
nuclear power, which supplies 12% of the Nation's electricity may
 
hinge on the waste'isdue. 'If the technicians and scientists don't
 
come up with an answer soon, we ought to put a moratorium on new
 
licensing,' threatens Sen. Gary Hart of Colorado, Chairman of the
 
Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation. California and Maine
 
already have banned new plant construction until an-acceptable waste
 
plan is developed--a policy that the President's Council of
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Environmental Quality advocates for the entire U. S. New York
 
Gov. Hugh Carey recently said he will seek to bar future nuclear
 
plants in his state because of the waste question...The resolu­
tion of the thorny nuclear waste -issuewill lar-ge-l-y -depend on­
the ability of politicians, elected for just a few years, to make
 
judgments whose effects stretch thousands of years into the fu­
ture. 'This is unlike other public-policy problems,' Rep. Udall
 
sighs, 'The damn thing may be impossible."'
 
Perhaps during this time of uncertainty and change it is appropriate to freshly
 
examine the pros and cons, requirements, and timing associated with the space
 
disposal option.
 
1.2 MILITARY HLW
 
This report constitutes a step in the direction of reexamining the space
 
disposal option. It is aimed, however, at examining only the possibility of
 
disposing of military HLW in space. This decision has been made because it
 
does not appear currently feasible to use the next generation of space vehicles
 
(the Shuttle) to dispose of spent fuel rods from commercial nuclear reactors
 
since the Shuttle weight limitations would require an excessive number of
 
flights. Furthermore, it is currently not possible to reduce this weight
 
requirement by removing the uranium and the cladding from the commercial spent
 
fuel because President Carter has indefinitely deferred reprocessing of com­
mercial spent fuel. On the other hand, it should be noted that the military
 
spent fuel has been previously reprocessed due to the requirement to extract
 
the plutonium for nuclear weapons fabrication.
 
Extensive examinations of the status of the storage and disposal of
 
military HLW have been performedl2 ,13,14,15,1 6 . A comparison of the military
 
and the civilian HLW inventories by Krugmann and Von Hippe1 1 7 indicates that
 
the civilian inventory is comparable to the military inventory. The majority
 
of the military HLW is stored in liquid storage tanks. The detailed form of
 
the HLW in these tanks varies with location. For example the material in the
 
Hanford tanks is in combinations of three different forms: salt cake, liquor
 
and sludge. This military HLW is approximately 100 times more dilute than
 
that projected for commercial HLW from nuclear power plants. In addition, the
 
military liquid HLW that is presently stored in mild carbon steel tanks has
 
had large quantities of sodium hydroxide added to neutralize the nitric acid
 
in the waste. The waste was neutralized in order to prevent the nitric acid
 
from dissolving the walls of the storage tanks. This additiQn-of sodiumhy=
 
droxid-. has inc-reased the difftkculty of performing subsequent chemical opera­
tions on the waste to selectively remove some of its components.
 
The liquid HLW at Savannah River is also neutralized and stored in steel
 
tanks. The HLW at Idaho Falls has been calcined to the form of a dry powder
 
in order to decrease its mobility in the soil in the event of a tank leak.
 
Hence, the military HLW is presently stored in tanks in two forms: dry powder,
 
and neutralized "liquid." Of course, the major question is not the form of
 
the waste but what should be done to dispose of the waste.
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An analysis of 27 options for disposing the HLW at Hanford -indicates
 
that the cheapest option is to leave the waste in the storage tanks and re­
12
 place the tanks as necessary . The National Academy of Sciences report indi­
gates that this solution is unacceptable and that a non-institutional long­
term solution for HLW disposal is required1 5 (p. xiii). National governmental
 
policy and regulations on.this matter are not clear at present.
 
1.3 LICENSING UNCERTAINTIES
 
The NRC is required to license the disposal of all HLW 18 . The NRC
 
regulations for licensing are predicated on the EPA's development of a numeri­
cal standard for HLW. This EPA standard was previously scheduled for 1-9773.
 
This schedule has not been met. Present indications are that the development
 
of a standard for IiLW disposal will be much more difficult than was previously
 
expected. For example, many major objections and improvements were made to
 
EPA's plan at an EPA sponsored waste management public forum held in Denver 19 .
 
EPA presently estimates that it will complete its nuclear waste standard by
 
198520. Clearly, the scientific uncertainties of terrestrial HLW disposal are
 
much more difficult to resolve than was thought to be the case a few years
 
ago. There may be fundamental limitations on the abilities of modern science
 
and technology to ensure adequately safe terrestrial disposal of-HLW.
 
It is even difficult for the technical community to settle on a Set of
 
criteria to determine the basic scientific data base that is required to
 
scientifically determine the suitability of a site for HL1W disposal. The
 
USGS7 (p. 9) has suggested a minimal set of requirements.
 
"We need, as a minimum, the permeability and porosity of the media
 
and the hydraulic head gradients all in three dimensions., In ­
addition, we need to know the sorptive characteristics of the
 
media along all paths, and we need to estimate the variable rates
 
at which the solidified wastes will enter the transporting fluids.
 
Needed, in particular, is information of the distribution and *
 
extent of major heterogeneities. The need for such data severely
 
taxes both the available data base and the technology for generating
 
it.
 
The ability of geologists to predict future geologic events has been questioned
 
by the USGS, leading-them to conclude that "Geology is basically a retrodictive
 
rather than a predictive science." They further note that "...many processes
 
probably can never modeled precisely" and that "...validating a waste manage­
ment model for the timespans of concern will never be possible." Disposal of
 
HLW in space may be a way to eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, these
 
scientific and technological uncertainties. However, we must ensure that we ­
don't trade one set of uncertainties for an equally dangerous alternate set.
 
1.4 SPACE DISPOSAL POSSIBILIES
 
The idea of dis osing of nuclear wastes in space is not new. According
 
to the "Lewis Report" (p. 2) which was written in 1974:
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"The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the National Aeronautics and
 
Space Administration, and others have suggested that radioactive
 
nuclear wastes could be transported into space for disposal thereby
 
eliminating the long-term storage of such wastes on Earch. This
 
metho& potentially resolves the d"fficulties presented by controlled
 
Earth storage of wastes that have decay half-lives measured in
 
thousands of years." (Emphasis added)
 
A recent "Marshall Report" 2 2 (p. 1) concludes that space disposal is feasible
 
although it notes a weight limitation for space disposal.
 
"The disposal of certain components of high-level nuclear waste in
 
space appears to be feasible from a technical standpoint. Disposal
 
of all high-level waste (Mix No. 1) in space is impractical because
 
of the high launch rate required, and the resulting environmental
 
impact, energy requirements, and economic factors. Thus, some form
 
of waste separation will be required. A separation of just the un­
used uranium and cladding reduces the launch rate by a factor of 40."
 
(Emphasis added).
 
A variety of potential destinations have been considered for space dis­
posal of nuclear waste. These destination include:
 
OHigh Earth Orbit 
*Earth-Moon Libration Points
 
*Moon Orbit
 
*Soft Landing-on Moon
 
*Solar Orbit Between Orbits of Earch and Venus
 
*Solar Orbit Between Orbits of Earth and Mars
 
OSolar Impact
 
*Solar System Escape
 
The stability of orbits for these destinations has been examined. A SAI
 
report 2 3 (p. 35) concluded that "Numerical techniques are presently inadequate
 
for being able'to integrate numerous orbits for 105 years in the Earth-Moon
 
system in an economical fashion." Hence, the long-term stability of the -High
 
Earth Orbit, Earth-Moon Libration points, and the Moon Orbit is presently not
 
sufficiently understood to use these destinations for HLW disposal. The possi­
bility of soft land HLW on the Moon has been examined in the Marshall Report.
 
This destination appears technically feasible and could result in long-term
 
containment of the waste. According to this report:
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"The only way that waste could return to Earth from the lunar surface
 
would be as a result of meteoric impact, with some of the material
 
achieving escape from the Moon and returning to Earth as a result of
 
solar radiation pressure. The probability of the aforementioned hap­
pening is considered to be small; if it did happen, the amount of
 
waste reaching the Earth would be very small."
 
SAI has shown that certain heliocentric orbits between Earth and Mars,
 
I
and between Earth and Venus are stable for one million years. The Marshall
 
Report finds that "A good choice for a solar orbit would be a circular orbit
 
inside the Earth's orbit at 0.86 AU from the Sun." (Ref. 23, p. 38). On the
 
other hand, the Marshall report finds that "...a solar impact mission should
 
be considered as impractical" due to the limitations of current chemical pro­
pulsion systems (emphasis added). The Marshall Report finds that solar system
 
escape is possible with current chemical propulsion systems. However:
 
"The major disadvantage to the solar system escape mission is the
 
8,750 m/s AV required. This high energy requirement limits the OTV's
 
payload to 687 kg per flight. Also, a failure during the OTV burn
 
could leave the nuclear waste in a heliocentric orbit with a perihelion
 
of 1 AU."
 
The payload for solar escape (687 kg) is smaller than the payload for the
 
0.86 AU heliocentric orbit (4,450 kg).
 
Thus, the technical possibility exists for at least three destinations
 
for high-level nuclear waste disposal. These are:
 
OSolar Orbit between Earth and Venus
 
OSolar Orbit between Earth and Mars
 
*Soft Landing on the Moon
 
NASA's current HLW disposal program is emphasizing the 0.86 AU heliocentric
 
orbit. The-remainder of this report will concentrate on this disposal desti­
nation.
 
1.5 UNIQUENESS OF SPACE DISPOSAL
 
The laws governing the movement of heavenly bodies within the solar
 
system are well established and validated. Furthermore, these laws have a
 
certain degree of simplicity and elegance. It is possible to predict the mo­
tions of heavenly bodies for millions of years with an high degree of confi­
dence in the accuracy of the calculations. To date the calculations that have
 
been performed indicate that if a HLW disposal package is correctly put into
 
a 0.86 AU heliocentric orbit, it wi.l remain in that stable orbit for at least
 
one million years. Hence, space-disposal appears to be characterized by
 
long-term predictability.
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This clearly contrasts with the various terrestrial disposal options
 
which are hampered by features such as geology not being a predictive science,
 
the absence of an adequate scientific data base for the evaluation of waste
 
disposal sites, the influence of climatic changes, changes in groundwater
 
distribution, -earthquakes, etc. However, the terrestrial disposal options are
 
presently characterized by short-term predictability. It appears that the
 
technology is well in band for digging tunnels, shafts, etc. associated with,
 
for example, bedded salt disposal systems. Similarly, it is possible to
 
immobilize HLW in a glass, package it, and place the container safely in a
 
disposal site. If the disposal site is discovered to have some serious
 
problem after a set of HLW canisters has been emplaced, they can be retrieved,
 
if retrievability is designed into the system.
 
In order for the space disposal option to receive a high degree of pub­
lic acceptability, the Government must be able to establish, beyond any
 
reasonable doubt, that the space disposal system is safe in both the short­
term and the long-term. It would be highly undesirable to trade the waste
 
disposal risks spread over perhaps a million years for comparable risks that
 
would occur in a single day! To ensure safety, extensive analysis and proof
 
testing must be performed on all components of the space disposal system for
 
all phases of the mission including the following phases:
 
OTransportation to launch site
 
OHandling at launch
 
OLaunch
 
*Ascent to low Earth orbit
 
*Operations in low Earth orbit
 
*Trajectory to 0.86 AU
 
*Insertion into orbit at 0.86 AU
 
Example requirements for these mission phases will be examined later in this
 
report. Since space disposal of HLW appears technically possible, it is
 
appropriate to examine the potential HLW payload to space in more detail.
 
1.6 PAYLOAD TO SPACE
 
According to the Marshall Report 2 2 (p. 15) spent fuel rods are consid­
ered as "unsuitable for space disposal because it is simply too massive for
 
transport (i.e., high flight numbers)-. Further, it has an unfavorable energy
 
penalty and poor economics." Hence, a payload more suitable to the space
 
option is required. If the space disposal option is viewed as an augmenta­
tion of the terrestrial disposal of HLW then certain components of the HLW
 
could be disposed of in space whereas other components could be disposed of
 
on Earth. Perhaps radionuclides which have half-lives greater than the order
 
of one-hundred years, and which constitute a significant toxic hazard would
 
be candidates for space disposal. The other radionuclides in the HLW would
 
be suitably disposed of on Earth. The quantitative distribution of HLW mass
 
as a function of radionuclide characteristics is examined later in this
 
report. Designing a terrestrial HLW disposal system to isolate the
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radionuclides from the biosphere for 1,000 years should certainly be much less
 
difficult than designing a million year repository.
 
If a space augmentation scheme for HLW disposal were to be pursued,
 
chemical processes and'technologies would have to be developed to separate the
 
long-lived, toxic radionuclides from the various forms of military HLW. R&D
 
budgets would have to be adjusted in accordance with the relative priority
 
of this waste disposal option. As part of this contemplated effort, eco­
nomic studies would be required in order to assess the influence of this option
 
on the overall military-HLW waste management cost. Environmental studies of
 
this option would be needed, since the processing of the waste would create
 
"side streams" which could have significant environmental impacts. In
 
addition, an overall plan involving governmental agencies such as NASA, DOE,
 
EPA, USGS, etc. would be required. Some aspects of such a plan are examined
 
later in this report.
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CHAPTER II
 
MILITARY HLW AND SPACE DISPOSAL
 
2.1 MILITARY WASTE - EXISTING AND PROJECTED
 
Very impressive characteristics of the stored military waste are its
 
enormous physical volume and the extreme dilution of the radionuclides. At
 
Hanford the in-tank waste consists of the following components:
 
Oll million gallons of bulk sludge consisting mainly of insoluble
 
metal oxides and hydroxides, with a specific gravity of 3.0
 
025 million gallons of salt cake (mostly sodium nitrate) deposited
 
over the sludge, with a specific gravity of 1.75
 
011 million gallons of caustic liquid, with a specific gravity of 1.5
 
@3 million gallons of liquid waste awaiting concentration
 
Tables 1 and 2 (Reference 1) list the radioactivity inventory of the in­
tank Hanford waste, and Table 3 (Reference 2) shows the mass distribution of
 
the radionuclides. About 0.4 MT of plutonium and 0.014 MT of americium-241
 
remain in the waste, mostly in the sludge, out of a total sludge mass of about
 
90,000 MT. The in-tank strontium 90 and cesium 137, which are the dominant
 
radionuclides for the first 500 years (Figure 1), each amount to about 0.3 MT,
 
out of a total of 350,000 MT of sludge, salt cake, and residual liquid combined.
 
It should be noted that about 0.45 MT of 9 0Sr and 1.4 MT of 1 3 7Cs have
 
already been separated from the in-tank wastes described above. These are
 
either encapsulated in double-walled metal cylinders immersed in a storage pool,
 
or are awaiting encapsulation. Each cylinder contains up to 150,000 curies
 
(average 100,000 curies, or about 0.7 kg) of strontium fluoride, or 80,000
 
curies (average 65,000 curies or about 1 kg) of cesium chloride. Furthermore,
 
each capsule contains an additional 100 cubic feet (about 5 MT) of other HLW
 
constituents which were not chemically separated from the cesium and the stron­
tium.
 
The waste volumes and radioactive inventory at Hanford just described have
 
resulted from reactor operations during the period 1944-1971. Since 1972, spent
 
fuel discharged from the single reactor still in operation has been accumulating
 
in fuel storage basins, An estimate of the impact of future wastes generated
 
at Hanford depends critically on the decision whether or not to resume repro­
cessing in the Purex Plant. If reprocessing of spent fuel is resumed in 1978,
 
in-tank waste volumes will be increased by approximately 5 percent by 1990.
 
If 9 0Sr and 13 7Cs are recovered directly from the acid wastes the number of
 
capsules containing strontium and cesium will be increased by about 40 percent
 
by 1990 (Reference 1).
 
The high-level waste inventory at Savannah River differs in detail from
 
the Hanford inventory, but has the same basic characteristics (Reference 3). If
 
waste removal from the storage tanks is initiated in 1985, the 31 tanks in
 
service will contain 13.3 million gallons of damp, crystallized salt, 3.4
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million gallons of sludge, and 5.6 million gallons of liquid waste. At
 
Savannah River the strontium and cesium have not been removed from the waste 
and encapsulated (Reference 3, p. 111-7). The HLW at Idaho Falls has been 
calcined to the form of a dry .ppwder inordero to.dec-rease its--mobi i-ty- in the 
soil in the event of a tank leak. 
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TABLE 1. (Reference 1)
 
Inventory of Major Fission Products in
 
Hanford High-Level Waste Decayed to 1990
 
(From Reactor Production - 1944 - 1971)
(Curies)
 
Salt(b) Residual
 
a Sludge(b) Licuorb) Capsules Total
 
aH * * 1.1 x 104 - 1.1 x 104 
1 4C * * * <1.6 x 104 
79Se * 8.2 x 102 * - - 8.2 x 102 
x 1O59 0 Sr 2.0 x 106 4.5 x 107 6.0 5.8 x io 1.1 x io6 
93Zr * 6.9 x IO * - 6.9 x 10' x 104

* * 3.1 x 104 - 3.199Tc 

206Ru * 3.7 x 10' 3.7 x 101 - 7.4 x 101 
1 Pd* 5.7 x 10' * - 5.7 x 101 
11 smCd * 5.0 x IO' * - 5.0 x 103 
1.1 x 10 * - 1.1 x 10212*mSn 
1 	 *Sn 6.8 x 10' * - 6.8 x 101 
1 *Sb 2.0 x 104 * - 2.0 x 104 
1291 * * 4.7 x 101 - 4.7 x 101 
134Cs 1.2 x 102 1.2 X l02 4.3 x 102 2.5 x IO 3.2 x 103 
X 102'SCs 4.4 x 10' 4.4 x 10I 1.6 9.0 x 102 1.1 x 103 
13CS 5.0 x 106 5.0 x 30, .1.8-X io 1.0a io 1.3 x 10. 
144Ce * 9.9 x 10 * - 9.9 x 10 
14p* 1.0 x 101 * - 1.0 x io 
5'Sm * 1.4 x 106 * - 1,,4 x 106 
12Eu* 1.5 x 10 * - 1.5 x IO 
14Eu * 7.3 x 104 * - 7.3 x 104 
ssEu* 7.4 x 10 * - 7.4 x 104 
a. Daughter nuclides in decay chains are not listed.
 
Curie values are for parent nuclide only.
 
b. Radionuclides present in trace quantities are
 
Indicated by an asterisk.
 
TABLE 2. (Reference 1)
 
Inventory of Major Actinides in
 
Hanford High-Level Waste Decayed to 1990
 
(From Reactor Production - 1944 - 1971)
 
(Curies)
 
Radionucllde(a) 	 Si udge
 
23SU 4.0 x 102 
235 U 1.3 x 101 
23aU 3.0 x 102 
237Np 1.0 x 10 
23 1Pu 4.0 x 102 
239 Pu 2.1 x 104 
24D pu 5.2 x iO3 
241Pu 6.0 x 104 
24 'Am 5.0 x 1C"
 
a. 	Salt Cake and Residual Liquor
 
contain trace quantities of
 
these. isotopes.
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TABLE 3. (Reference 2)
 
Hanford Tank Wastes: Inventory of Important Radionuclides 
(Tk 0.5 year) as of Mid-1977 (Average Post-Fission Time is 20 Years). 
Estimates are Based on Production Recordsa or are Calculated from 23SU 
Fission Yieldb 
Fission Productsb Actinides a 
(curies) (grams) (curies) (grams) 
Se-79 8.6 x 102 1.2 X 104 U-233 4X 10 4X 10 
St-90 a 4.7 X 107 3.3 X 1OS U-235 1.3X 10' 6 X 10 
Zr-93 4.3 X 103 1.7 X 106 U-238 3.0 X 102 91X 108 
s
Tc-99a 3.1 X 104 1.8 X 10 Np-237 1.1 X 102 1.5 X 10 
Ru-106 5.3 X 102 1.6 X 16- ' Pu-238 4.5 X 102 2.6 X 10' 
Cd-ll3m 1.8 x 102 7.7 x 10-1 Pu-239 2.1 x 104 ,.4 X 10' 
Sn-126 7 X 102 2.4 X 10 Pu-240 5.2 X 163 2.3 X 10 
Sb-125 6.5 X 1o 6.2 X 10' Pu-241 6.3 X 10 5.5 X 102 
1-129 a 7.3 X 10' 4. X 10' Pu-242 2 X 100 5.2 X 102 
Cs-134 3.1 X 10 2.3 X 101 Am-241 4.5 X 104 1.A X 14 
Cs-135 4.8 X 102 6.2 X 10 Am-242m <5 <5X 10' 
0 sCs-137 4 2.8 10' 3.1 X Am-243 <1 <5 
Ce-144 4.2 X 101 1.3 X 10' Cm-244 <S <10 - t 
Pm-147 3.3 X 106 3.6'X 103 
4.6 X 106 1.6 X 10
s 
Sm-151 
Eu-152 3.9X 103 2X 102 
10 s 2.5 X 102Eu-154 3.5.X 
Eu-155 4.1 X 103 31 100 
alnventories of actinides and four fission products (90S, 99Tc, 1291, sTCs) were esti­
mated by 0. V. Hill, Atlantic Richfield Hanford Co., pesonal communication, 1977 
from: a) total reactor and separation operations; (b) recoveries of separated 9OSr, II7cQ, 
and 23 Np from wastes; and (c) some analyses of tank contents after separation of 9°St, 
137C, and 237Np. 3 
Although the half life of H is 12.3 years, it has been excluded, because at all stages 
of separations operations and volume reduction (evaporation) 3 H follows the water or 
water vapor phase. As of this date, most of the 3 H originally produced has been lost to 
ground or airborne effluents. The small amount remaining in the tanks will be volatilized, 
if the wastes are solidified by a heating process. 
It has been assumed that all of the 1291 produced is present In the tanks. That is an 
overestimate, because some 1291 was volatilized and dissipated with airborne effluents 
during the original Pu separations. 
The 90 Sr and 13 7 Cs remaining in the tanks are about 37 and 20 percent, respectively, 
of the total inventory. The balance of those nuclides has been separated and is tempo­
rarily stored In separate tanks or has been solidified and encapsulated and is stored in a 
water basin in B plant. 237 
About 90 percent of the Np produced has been separated and shipped offsite as 
starting mateflal for 2 3 8 pu production. 
bCalculated by P. W. Durbin from 2 3 5 U fission yield given in ERDA-1538:Table III-D-2, 
and the quantity of 99 Tc given by 0. F. Hill, corrected for 20-year decay. For example, 
Table III-D-2 shows at 20 years 193 curies of 93 Zr and 1,400 curies of 9 9 Tc; Hill's table 
shows 31,000 curies of 9 9 Tc. Total 9 3 Zr = 1.93 X 102 X 3.1 X 104/1.4 X 103 = 4,300 
curies. 
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FIGURE 1. (Reference 1)
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2.2 PROCESSING OF MILITARY WASTE FOR DISPOSAL
 
Three approaches to the problem of the terminal disposal of high-level
 
military wastes in space are identified in Figure -2. Based on using currently
 
-ava-ilabe: tethtIogy, each of these approaches presents formidable problems
 
for the space option.
 
1. The first approach is based on a process discussed in the Hanford
 
Defense Waste Document which removes the Pu, 2 4 1Am and 99Tc, which are
 
long-lived actinides and fission products. If these radionuclides are disposed
 
of in space, this approach reduces the rest of the high-level waste to a 500­
700 year problem. However, it should be noted that if this chemical separation
 
process is used the actinides and long-lived fission products are mixed with
 
about 7,000 MT of alkaline waste. If the assumption is made that 4.4 MT of
 
waste can be put in a 0.86 AU solar orbit for each pair of.shuttle launches
 
(Reference 4, pg. 38), then approximately 3,200 shuttle launches would be
 
required to eliminate the Pu, Am and Tc from the Hanford HLW. Hence, the
 
alkali waste associated with process #1 must be reduced by about two orders
 
of magnitude in order to reduce the number of shuttle launches to more feasible
 
limits.
 
2. The second approach not only removes the Pu, Am and Tc but also re­
moves 99.99% of 137Cs and 9 0Sr, for subsequent disposal in space. On a labor­
atory scale the removal of strontium and actinides by carrier precipitation
 
with inert strontium phosphate has been demonstrated, according to the Hanford
 
Defense Waste Document (Reference 1, p. 5-17):
 
"Recent laboratory studies have shown that the removal of strontium
 
and actinides from salt solutions by sodium titanate, an inorganic
 
ion exchanger, is a very effective method which can be used along
 
or in conjunction with carrier precipitation.
 
Some residual liquors and salt cake solutions contain organic com­
plexants that interfere with the removal of strontium-90 (9 0Sr)
 
and actinides. Laboratory studies have shown that ozonation of the
 
solutions will oxidize the complexants to carbon dioxide and/or
 
organic material that do not inhibit removal of 9 0Sr by precipita­
tion or sorption techniques. Some precipitation of strontium also
 
occurs during ozonation.
 
The technology for removal of cesium and technetium from salt solu­
tions by ion exchange with cation and anion resins, respectively,
 
has been demonstrated."
 
Figure 3 illustrates the various steps in process #2.
 
A considerable research and development effort is required to scale-up
 
these laboratory studies to the pilot plant level. But the main difficulty
 
with this procedure for the space option is that about 5 percent of the inert
 
components are carried along with the fission products and actinides. Thus,
 
for the Hanford waste the output of the radionuclide removal process is
 
approximately 2.4 million gallons of powdered high-level waste, or about
 
20,000 MT. Taking into account the payload capacity of the Space Shuttle, the
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HANFORD HIGH-LEVEL WASTE 
0.4 MT Pu 
0.014 MT 241AM 
0.18 MT 99Tc
 
0.80 MT 90Sr
 
1.7 MT 137Cs
 
350,000 MT of alkali
 
PROCESS #3
PROCESS #i PROCESS #2 

0.4 MT Pu # 1 plus # 1 plus
 
99.99% of 137Cs and 99.999% of 137Cs and
0.014 MT 241 Am 

90Sr plus
0.18 MT 99Tc 90Sr plus 

20,000 MT alkali 200 MT of alkali
7,000 MT of alkali 

FIGURE 2
 
The output of three processes for removing selective components of the Hanford HLW.
 
The first two processes are based on current literature. The third process is
 
hypothetical.
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FIGUUE 3, 
Process #2 for removing Pu, Am, Tc and
 
137Cs & 90 Sr for subsequent disposal in space.
 
0R!1INAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
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concentration of actinides and major fission products in the high-level waste
 
must be increased by about two orders of magnitude in order to make space
 
disposal a potentially viable option for military waste.
 
3. The third approach is based on the removal of 99.999% of 13 7Cs and
 
9 0Sr in addition to the Pu, Am and Tc removed in process #1. This method does
 
not now exist. From Figure 1 it can be shown that this approach would reduce
 
the radioactivity content of the remaining waste to about 3000 Ci and would
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enable it to be handled as low-level waste (10 Ci/gm). However, as a part
 
of this idealized process,some method would have to be developed to reduce the
 
waste accompanying these fission products by two orders of magnitude to about
 
200 MT of alkali. If this were done, about 90 shuttle launches would be re­
quired to dispose of the Hanford HLW.
 
2.3 DESCRIPTION AND REQUIREMENTS OF SPACE OPTION
 
Over the past years NASA studies have examined a number of possible
 
space destinations for military HLW disposal (see Section 1). Emphasis is
 
currently being given to emplacing the HLW in a heliocentric orbit. The pri­
mary criteria for selection of a baseline space orbit are: (1) stability of
 
the orbit for at least one million years in order to allow for decay of the
 
actinides and their daughter products to harmless levels; (2) low energy re­
quirements to inject the waste package into this orbit. Another way of stating
 
the second criterion is that the payload capability of the propulsion system
 
should be large enough so that not more than one Space Shuttle launch per week
 
is required over a period of 20-40 years in order to dispose of the military
 
HLW in space. The space mission that best meets these requirements is an orbit
 
around the Sun about halfway between Earth and Venus (0.86 AU). This mission
 
has been selected by NASA for more intensive study. The payload for this orbit
 
including waste and canister is about 5 HT (Reference 4, pg. 97).
 
A brief step-by-step examination of the mission scenario is helpful in
 
identifying those elements for which technology already exists, and those ele­
ments for which new technology or engineering development is required. This
 
mission involved the launch of two Space Shuttles per waste payload: one
 
Shuttle carries the waste package and a small solid propellant second stage
 
that places the payload into its orbit around the Sun. The second Shuttle
 
carries an orbital transfer vehicle (OTV). The sequence of events is as fol­
lows:
 
(1) "Launch of Shuttle No. I carrying the fueled OTV without a HLW pay­
load into low Earth orbit (LEO).
 
(2) Development of OTV in low Earth orbit (LEO) and complete checkout
 
of OTV propulsion and attitude control systems by Shuttle No. I astronauts.
 
(3) Launch of Shuttle No. 2 carrying the nuclear waste package to near­
rendezvous with the OTV now separated from Shuttle No. 1.
 
(4) Removal of waste package from Shuttle No. 2 by using remote manipu­
lator arms. Final checkout of stabilization of package.
 
(5) Withdrawal of Shuttld No. 2 to a covenient distance and docking of
 
OTV with waste packagej
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(6) Removal of protective "cocoon" from waste package as the OTV backs
 
away carrying the waste package. The "cocoon" includes the reentry thermal
 
protection system, mechanical containment, and gamma ray shield.
 
(7) Burn of OTV engine (AV-= 3-260 m/sec) to place the waste package and 
its storable propellant stage on an elliptical transfer path from LEO to a 
perihelion of 0.86 AU six month later. Separation of OTV from waste package 
after burn, and return of OTV to LEO. 
(8) Upon arrival of waste package at perihelion of 0.86 AU the orbital
 
insertion stage engine is ignited (AV = 1190 m/sec) to circularize orbit of
 
waste package around the sun.
 
(9) Retrieval of OTV by Shuttle No. 1 and retrieval of cocoon by
 
Shuttle No. 2. Return of Shuttles to Earth.
 
Some phases of this mission scenario can be accomplished with existing
 
technology or technology under development. Other phases would require new
 
development, e.g., develop a suitable OTV. But, as pointed out in Section 1,
 
the "risk" in both the short-term and long-term must be reduced to acceptably
 
low levels. Four classes of possible accidents require the extension of
 
existing systems or the development of new systems. Each of these situations
 
is discussed briefly below: (See also Reference 4).
 
(a) Catastrophic event at the launch pad.
 
A remotely controlled, manually activated means of ejecting the payload
 
is required to take care of the low, but non-zero probability of a catastrophic
 
event at the launch pad (Reference 4, pg. 87). A back-up automatic ejection
 
of the payload is also required in case the manual system should become inoper­
ative. During this event the payload must remain intact.
 
(b) 	Waste package Shuttle abort during either boost or
 
LEO insertion phases.
 
In the event of an abort in flight, NASA risk analyses consider dumping
 
of excess Shuttle propellant prior to landing in order to minimize explosive
 
potential since the waste package is still aboard the Shuttle. In the event
 
of less serious failures, such as not acquiring proper LEO orbit, a back-up
 
Shuttle could be provided to repair the failed Shuttle (No. 2), or to transfer
 
or retrieve the payload in orbit. Ejection of the payload is also possible.
 
(c) 	OTV failures during operations with nuclear waste package in LEO.
 
A means of ejecting the payload from the OTV must be provided. The pay­
load itself is designed with a reentry heat shield and mechanical containment
 
system, including aerodynamic braking and parachutes, in order to keep the
 
nuclear waste package intact during water or land impact. The payload must be
 
designed so that it will either float in sea water, or release a "trailing
 
wire" to communicate its position if it should sink. Search and recovery aids
 
such as transponders, sonar, and dye markers must also be included in the
 
"cocoon." If the payload ejection system fails, a recovery plan must be
 
available to retrieve the waste package.
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(d) After leaving LEO: OTV abort or storable propellant stage abort.
 
Once the "cocoon" is removed, certain failures of the OTV during the
 
long burn, or failures in the small solid propellant stage at perihelion
 
would leave the nuclear waste package in an unplanned and unstable orbit with­
out its protective system. Since potential Earth reencounter and subsequent
 
burn up in the earth's atmosphere is unacceptable, a method of dealing with
 
this potential problem is required. This possibility requires the development
 
of a deep-space rendezvous, docking and retrieval capability that does not
 
now exist. The nuclear waste package must be equipped with a transponder so
 
that it can be located in deep space.
 
In this connection it seems clear that the nuclear waste package should
 
be periodically tracked along its 6-month elliptical transfer path from LEO
 
to perisol, and probably for some period of time after circularization of its
 
orbit around the Sun. With a launch rate of one Shuttle per week, or one pay­
load every two weeks, about a dozen simultaneous payloads need to be tracked
 
in deep space.
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CHAPTER III
 
INTERAGENCY AND REGULATORY INTERACTIONS
 
The development of a viable program for space augmentation of military
 
HLW disposal will require extensive interaction between the governmental agen­
cies involved, the Congress, the President, the involved states, and the Ameri­
can public, since the issues involved in radioactive waste management are di­
verse and significant. These issues have recently been examined by the NRC
 
(References 1 and 2). An analysis of the history of U.S. waste management has
 
been critical of the way waste management policy has been conceptualized, espe­
cially because of uncritical faith in the technological fix. "Past AEC prac­
tices of virtually ignoring critical outsiders need to be reconsidered."
 
(Reference 1, pg. 15). However, "No system has, in fact, been implemented for
 
disposing of high-level wastes." (Reference 1, pg. 53). "There appears to be
 
extraordinary uncertainty regarding the consequences of error in the management
 
of wastes." (Reference 1, pg. 54 with emphais added.) A properly conceptu­
alized and carried out space disposal program could considerably reduce these
 
uncertainties. However, first the agencies must develop plans and alternatives
 
for the technology and regulations governing HLW disposal. The Congress and the
 
President must approve and fund these plans, and the general public must con­
sider the plans to be acceptable. This chapter focuses on the part of this
 
process dealing with the interaction among federal governmental agencies.
 
3.1 PRINCIPAL AGENCIES
 
The military HLW results principally from reprocessing irradiated urani­
um as part of the nuclear weapons program and also from the nuclear submarine
 
program. Since these are ongoing programs any major decisions involving mili­
tary 1LW will involve the Department of Defense (DOD). This is particularly
 
the case if the cost of a particular waste disposal option comes out of the DOD
 
budget. The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for development of the
 
technology for HLW disposal,and presumably the disposal of the waste. The
 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for promulgating a set of
 
numerical standards for the disposal of HLW. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 
(NRC) is responsible for writing regulatory criteria to ensure that the EPA
 
standards are met. Based on these criteria, DOE's HLW disposal plans and sys­
tems will be examined by NRC to determine whether or not to issue a license.
 
In the case of the space disposal option, the National Aeronautics and
 
Space Administration (NASA) would play a vital role. A proposed division of
 
responsibilities between DOE and NASA is shown in Figure 4. NASA would be
 
responsible for safety system development at the launch site and in space. NASA
 
would also be responsible for launch site development and modifications. DOE
 
would be responsible for developing storage sites, a ground transportation sys­
tem and a waste factionation system. NASA and DOE would jointly consider such
 
items as operations, safety, cost, waste container, abort and environmental
 
impacts.
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Fig. 4 
Schematic of NASA and DOE Interfaces for Space Disposal
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The above provides a broad outline of responsibilities for the principal
 
agencies involved in a HLW space disposal program. iOther agencies sugh as the
 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the President's Office of Science and Technology
 
Policy (OSTP), and the Council on Environmental Quality would probably also
 
take an active rdle in the development and evaluation of the space disposal
 
option. The goals, responsibilities, budgets, manpower required, timing and
 
the principal interactions of these agencies within the space disposal program
 
would have to be formulated in detail. The next section provides our interpre­
tation of some of the interactions along with comments on potential timing for
 
the space disposal option.
 
3.2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
 
Before examining the interactions and timing required for the space dis­
posal option, it is useful to review the history of previous programs for geo­
logical disposal of HLW. It is apparently difficult to accurately forecast
 
schedules for the development of HLW disposal systems. In 1957 the National
 
Academy of Sciences' Committee on Waste Management reported "The most promising
 
method of disposal of high-level waste at the present time seems to be in salt
 
deposits." (Reference 3) According to the NAS analysis, four years later, the
 
same advisory committee reported "Experience both in the field and in the labor­
atory on the disposal of wastes in salt have been very productive and well con­
ceived; plans for the future are very promising." (Reference 2, pg. 4) In
 
June of 1970, a decision was made to locate a HLW disposal site at Lyons,
 
Kansas. By February of 1972 the Lyons project was officially dead (Reference 2,
 
pg. 4). The concept of the Retrievable Surface Storage Facility (RSSF) was
 
announced in May 1972. In-April of 1974 the Administrator of ERMA, R. Seamans,
 
withdrew his request for funds to build a RSSF (Reference 2, pg. 8). In March
 
of 1976 an Ad Hoc Interagency Task Force on Commercial Nuclear Waste Management
 
was formed to ensure internal compatibility of the Federal Government's HLW
 
activities. The task force was chaired by 0MB, and included representatives from
 
CEQ, EPA, ERDA, NRC and USGS. This group forecasted operation of a repository
 
for commercial HLW by 1985 (Reference 4, pg. 17). The 1985 target date is no
 
longer feasible (Reference 5). A new plan is being developed by the Interagency
 
Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management, whi&h is headed by DOE Secretary
 
Schlesinger. The report from this group was previously due to be delivered to
 
President Carter by October, 1978. The report was finalized in March , 1979.
 
Preliminary indications are that a commercial repository can not be made opera­
tional before 1989. Hence, the "schedule" appears to have slipped four years
 
in the last two years. The 1989 schedule assumes that NRC issues a license for
 
the HLW repository before EPA completes its promulgation of numerical standards
 
for HLW. The public acceptability of this shortcut needs to be determined. If
 
this approach is not considered acceptable, NRC may have to wait until EPA's
 
standard is issued before finalizing its regulatory criteria. If EPA's stan­
dard were completed in 1985, as is currently estimated, then the 1989 date
 
could not be met. Scheduling of a HLW disposal plan may continue to be very
 
difficult until the public's concern of the uncertainties involved is substan­
tially diminished. Perhaps a careful development of the space disposal option
 
would decrease public concern about HLW disposal.
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3.3 SPACE DISPOSAL INTERACTIONS AND TIMING
 
Development of a complete system for space disposal of selected compo­
nents of military HLW requires the performance of many interrelated activities
 
on the parts of NRC,. EPA,. NASA-.and-DOE. For -the-purpose-of discussion, 'wechave
 
arranged these activities in the following five principal categories:
 
OMajor Decisions and Milestones
 
OWaste Retrieval System
 
*Waste Chemical Extraction and Solidification System
 
OSpace Disposal System, and
 
*Space Specific Standards, Criteria and Regulations.
 
The relationships among these categories is depicted in Figure 5. The cate­
gories are indicated by dashed lines in Figure 5. The dashed lines enclose
 
the activities which occur within each of these principal categories. Solid
 
lines are used between two or more activities to indicate that the initiation
 
of one activity (or a set of activities) depends on the completion of a pre­
ceding activity. Arrows are used to indicate the direction of the activity
 
flow. For some of the vertical lines the absence of arrows indicates that
 
information flows both upward and downward.
 
A variety of symbols has been used in Figure 5 to provide highly visi­
ble indications of the nature of the various activities. The definitions of
 
the symbols follow:
 Q Major Decisions and Milestones 
O Regulation, Standard or Criteria 
LEnvironmental Impact Statement
 
NRC Review, Permit or License
A " 
mOther 
Activities.
 
,Each of the five principal categories is discussed separately in the following
 
section of the report. Interfaces among the five principal categories are
 
described at appropriate places in the text.
 
3.3.1 Major Decisions and Milestones.
 
The major decisions and major milestones for the space disposal program
 
are shown in the dashed box in the middle of Figure 5. The first major de­
cision is assumed to take place in 1980 in order to provide initial funding
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for space augmented disposal of military HLW. In the diagram this decision is
 
designated by the number 1 to the lower right of the decision diamond shaped
 
symbol. Clearly, if this decision is not favorable, then only the terrestrial
 
disposal options are possible. It should be noted that if this decision or any
 
major decision is delayed beyond the dates shown, then the entire program
 
slips. In parallel with the decision making process, it is assumed that the
 
preparation of a draft generic EIS (DGEIS) on HLW waste disposal methods (#33)
 
cohtinues. During the formulation and preparation of the Draft EIS, it appears
 
that the process should be conducted in a very open manner. Special efforts
 
should be made to ensure active and extensive participation of the states,
 
affected local governments and the general public. Such an open policy may
 
cause some delays; however, it would tend to allow legitimate issues to be sur­
faced and resolved in a publicly acceptable manner. We believe that such an
 
open approach would increase the confidence of the general public in the space
 
augmentation option for nuclear waste disposal. This open approach has been
 
recommended previously (Ref. 4). The trend of the governmental institutions
 
involved appears to be in this direction. EPA's series of public workshops
 
and DOE's public forums are certainly steps in this direction. Referring back
 
to Box #33 of the chart, a set of parallel activities is shown after comple­
tion of the Draft GETS in 1980. This schedule for the DGEIS may be viewed as
 
somewhat pessimistic; however, in view of past slippages we choose a more con­
servative date rather than 1979. Assuming that the -comments on the Draft do
 
not reveal any fundamentally serious problems, the draft could be finalized
 
within two years (#34).
 
Following a yes from #1, a joint NASA/DOE concept definition study for
 
space disposal is prepared and finalized in 1981 (#35). Following this, a
 
joint NASA/DOE Draft-GEIS on space augmentation of military HLW disposal is
 
prepared and-then issued in 1982. (#36) Based generally on the progress of
 
the program and particularly on whether or not the development of the required
 
new technology for chemical extraction is considered to affect the administra­
tions anti-proliferation policy, a presidential/congressional decision is made.
 
Figure 5 shows this decision being made in 1983 (#37). A no decision is
 
equivalent to ending, or at least significantly slowing, the space disposal
 
program.
 
The next major milestone shown is the finalization of the GElS on space
 
isolation of military HLW in 1984 (#38). Upon completion of the space GETS,
 
the Congress and the President could make an interim evaluation of the pro­
gress of the space disposal program to decide whether or not to approve a fur­
ther block of funding for these activities. If, at this time, the uncertain­
ties associated with the geological disposal concepts appeared to be decreasing
 
at a sufficiently rapid rate, the space disposal program could be delayed and
 
funded at a lower level. On the other hand, if these uncertainties were not
 
judged to be decreasing at a sufficient rate, or if the attitudes of the States
 
toward disposal of HLW in their states continued to be negative, then the next
 
phase of the space disposal program could be approved. Assuming a favorable
 
dEjcision, NASA paper studies are prepared which culminate in an EIS on the en­
tire space isolation system (#40). Sufficient information about the space
 
system is assumed to be available by 1987 for formal and informal approvals
 
by the international community, the Federal Government, the State governments 
and affected local governments (#41). Assuming these approvals are obtained
 
and that the program proceeds as shown, the complete system for space augmented­
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disposal of military HLW could be operational in the year 2000. (#42)
 
Now that the "Major Decisions and Major Milestones" category has been
 
described in some detail, it is appropriate to-describe the other four major
 
categories shown in Figure 5.
 
3.3.2 Waste Retrieval System
 
The principal activities leading to an operational waste retrieval system
 
are shown in the dashed-in box at the top of Figure 5. After a favorable
 
initial presidential/congressional funding decision on space augmented disposal
 
of military HLW (#l), DOE initiates and completes a concept definition study
 
.for a military HLW waste retrieval system (#2) in 1980. The chart indicates
 
that NRC drafts criteria and regulations for military waste retrieval system
 
(#3) by 1982. NRC's jurisdiction in this area is presently unclear. This
 
question has been examined previously (Reference 4, page 29).
 
"... it is interesting to note that ERDA is regulating itself in 
the areas of temporary'storage treatment. According to Willrich, 
... this type of ERDA self-regulation is specifically authorized
 
by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This approach may be justifiable
 
on national security grounds in part.'"
 
"The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 provides-NRC the authority
 
to license only certain ERDA facilities: (emphasis added)
 
Retrievable surface storage facilities and other facilities
 
authorized for the express purpose of subsequent long-term storage
 
of high-level radioactive waste generated by the Administration,
 
which is not used for or are part of, research and development
 
activities.'
 
However, an NRC operating license is required for the actual disposal -of
 
HLW in space (#42). Since an NRC license is ultimately required, it is desir­
able to have NRC become deeply involved in the program at an early time in
 
order to minimize costly misunderstandings and other problems at the time of
 
final licensing. We have addressed this issue*previously in our report to the
 
President's Science Advisor (Ref. 4, p. 36).
 
"If NRC is 'excluded' from both site selection review and the granting
 
of constructions licensing, it would not be able to make important
 
independent formal judgments of the adequacy of the repository until
 
the application for an operating license was filed. If, at that time,
 
NRC found the site to be inadequate, the entire process of site selection
 
and construction would have to be repeated for a new site. This type of
 
potential delay could be avoided if NRC exercised regulatory authority
 
over both siting and construction. The additional efforts that these
 
requirements would impose on ERDA do not appear to be excessive, since
 
ERDA personnel have indicated that they plan to informally submit the
 
same information to NRC that would be submitted if formal-site review and
 
construction licensing were required. In addition, this type of strong
 
regulatory control by NRC could help to improve public perception
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of the national high-level waste management program. Hence, we conclude
 
that NRC should have regulatory control over siting and construction of
 
high-level waste repositories for both commercial and military waste."
 
We believe that similar reasoning applies to disposal of military HLW in space.
 
Thus, we have assumed that NRC will have jurisdiction in this type of
 
matter; hence, NRC is shown as developing criteria and regulations for the
 
military HLW waste retrieval system (#3). In parallel with NRC's draft cri­
teria and regulations for military waste retrieval, DOE performs R&D on the
 
waste retrieval system (#4) including initial experiments on Waste retrieval
 
(#5).
 
After completion of these preliminary activities, DOE has sufficient in­
formation to formulate a program definition of the waste retrieval-system (#7)
 
in 1983. By 1984 DOE is shown as completing the design of the waste retrieval
 
system (#8). In parallel with this design activity, DOE initiates the process
 
to develop an EIS for the waste retrieval system (#9). NRC finalized the cri­
teria and regulations for the waste retrieval system (#6) in 1984. NRC is
 
then in a position to consider DOE's application for a construction permit.
 
(It should be noted that DOE is currently not required to obtain an NRC con­
struction permit for this type of activity). After NRC grants the construction
 
permit (#10), DOE completes the building of the waste retrieval system (#11)
 
in 1989. Next, NRC grants an operating license (#12) and DOE initiates opera­
tion of the waste retrieval facility (or facilities) in 1990 (#13). This
 
completes the description of the activities involved in producing an opera­
tional Waste Retrieval System. Next, we consider the activities 'and events
 
associated with the development and operation of a chemical extraction facili­
ty.
 
3.3.3 Chemical Extraction and Solidification Systems
 
The principal activities leading to an operational chemical extraction
 
and waste solidification facility are shown in the next lower dashed-in box in
 
Figure 5. The development of a chemical extraction system is required for
 
space augmented disposal of military 1LW because of the excessive weight and
 
energy required to dispose of all the military HLW in space. Subsequent to
 
initial funding for space disposal (#1), DOE evaluates chemical extraction
 
requirements for space isolation (#14). This evaluation influences the draft
 
GEIS on space isolation (#36). Based on these evaluations and the progress in
 
other programmatic areas, the executive and congressional branches of the
 
government will decide whether or not to approve further funding for chemical
 
extraction for space isolation (#37). A possibly sensitive issue involved in
 
this decision is whether or not the development of a new technology for chemi­
cal extraction would be considered to increase the danger of nuclear prolifer­
ation, especially if plutonium were separated from the fission products. If
 
presidential/congressional approval is obtained, then DOE proceeds to perform
 
R&D on the chemical extraction processes and system (#15). Based on both the
 
information gained during this R&D and prior information, DOE develops a pro­
gram definition for the chemical extraction system (#17). Next, DOE pro­
ceeds to design a facility for chemical extraction of the components of the
 
military HLW that are to be sent to space (#18), and to develop draft and
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final EIS's for this facility (#19). In parallel with these activities, NRC
 
finalizes its criteria and regulations for chemical extraction for space dispo­
sal (#16). NRC is then ready to consider DOE's application for a construction
 
permit for the chemical extraction facility (#20). (This s-tep may not be
 
required-). After the NRC construction permit is received, DOE builds the chem­
ical extraction facility (#21). Next, DOE applies for an NRC operating li­
cense. (This step may not be necessary). Once the NRC license is received
 
(#22), the plant is ready for operation (#23). It has been estimated that
 
this facility could be operating in 1991.
 
The HLW waste from the waste retrieval facility (#13) is then transferred
 
to the chemical extraction facility (#23) for removal-of the components of
 
military HLW that are to be disposed of in space. Co-location of the waste
 
removal system and the chemical extraction facility would minimize the efforts
 
required for the transfer of the space-bound waste. The assumption has been
 
made that these components are in a liquid form. Hence, it is necessary to
 
have a facility to convert them to a solid. However, if the process used in
 
the chemical extraction facility produces these components in a solidified
 
form, then a separate solidification facility would not be required. This, in
 
effect, combines the chemical extraction facility and the solidification facil­
ity. Such an approach would decrease the number of EIS's, construction per­
mits, and operating licenses by a factor of two. However, the information
 
content would effectively be the same.
 
The flow of activities leading to the operation of a space-bound waste
 
solidification facility (#32) is essentially identical to that shown for the
 
chemical extraction facility, hence, it is not discussed here. However, it
 
should be pointed out that the chart is based on the assumptions shown in the
 
asterisk accompanying box #24, that interim storage facilities and shipping
 
casks are assumed to be designed, demonstrated and fabricated during the time
 
that the chemical extraction facility and the solidification facility are being
 
developed.
 
Now that the DOE systems for waste retrieval, chemical separation and
 
solidification have been described, it is appropriate to examine both NASA's
 
activities in developing the space disposal system, and potential influence
 
of both EPA and NRC on these developments.
 
3.3.4 Space Standards, Criteria and Regulations
 
The fourth major chart category - "Space Standards, Criteria and Regula­
tions" is shown in the lower left dashed-in portion of Figure 5. Following _
 
the joint NASA/DOE concept definition study for space disposal (#35) in 1981,
 
it is assumed that NRC would be required to develop space specific draft siting
 
criteria (#43), and components of military HLW (#45). These criteria'would
 
presumably include items such as:
 
S launch site
 
* ascent trajectories
 
Slow Earth orbit activities, and
 
* final destination and stability
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In parallel, EPA is shown as developing numerical environmental standards for
 
the space isolation system (#47). This may not be an additional requirement
 
for EPA if the numerical standards for HLW disposal that are currently being
 
formulated are broad enough to-apply to the space augmentation option. Pre­
sumably, the EPA space disposal standards would include short-term considera­
tions that could be applied to low probability events such as explosions on
 
the launch pad, or an abort which caused the HLW package to land in the ocean.
 
The EPA environmental standard for space isolation is shown as complete in
 
1983. EPA is apparently having difficulties in formulating strategies to cope
 
with the long-term nature of geological waste disposal. (Ref. 6) It may be
 
easier for EPA to write a space disposal specific standard because of the
 
short-term risk nature of the space option. It is assumed that in 1984, NRC
 
releases the final report on the space military HLW performance criteria and
 
regulations (#48). These EPA and NRC requirements will impact the NASA pro­
gram for development of the space disposal system. These interfaces are dis­
cussed next.
 
3.3.5 Space Disposal System Development
 
The fifth and final major chart category, "Space Disposal System Develop­
ment," is outlined in the dashed-in box located in the lower right portion of
 
Figure 5.
 
Box #49 represents R&D activities required to develop a storage facility
 
for the HLW space package at the launch site. In addition, it represents the
 
activities needed to acquire capability to assemble the HLW package including
 
the "cocoon" containing the reentry heat shield, mechanical containment, gamma
 
ray shielding, etc. Box #51 shows that R&D activities are required to develop
 
a payload preparation and checkout system. This checkout would include checks
 
prior to and post insertion of the payload into the shuttle. Box 4150 indi­
cates the preliminary design activities required to understand and develop con­
cepts for the transportation system which takes the shuttle payload (including
 
HLW package) from the spaceport packaging facility and transports it to the
 
shuttle launch pad. This transportation system would include the necessary
 
facilities for loading the complete payload into the shuttle.
 
In parallel with these activities, concepts for the complete space dis­
posal mission operations would be developed for all phases of the space isola
 
tion activities (#52). R&D would be performed to examine the shuttle trans­
portation system to determine the types of system modifications that would be
 
required for the space waste isolation mission (#53). Perhaps some initial
 
experiments could be performed at the Kennedy launch site in order to do cold
 
testing of simulated payloads (#54). In addition, some preliminary R&D tests
 
of the portions of the projected recovery system could be made (#55). The
 
recovery system would be designed to perform recovery of the waste package
 
from either launch abort or difficulties encountered in near-Earth space. In
 
addition, the retrieval system would be designed to either correct the tra­
jectory, or safely return the waste package to Earth in the event of a failure
 
between LEO and the desired heliocentric orbit. These R&D activities would
 
lead to sufficient increases of understanding of the interactions of the above
 
system components to allow a'program definition phase of activity to start.
 
During this phase, the following program definition activities will be
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developed:
 
*Launch site storage and packaging (#56)
 
OPayload transportation and preparation (5-7) 
'*Shuttle transportation system and mission operations (#58)
 
ORecovery system (#59)
 
These activities complete the NASA program definition phase. In order to pro­
ceed to activities involving launch site selection and preparation of specific
 
space related EIS, the chart indicates that it is first necessary to obtain
 
the presidential/congressional approval indicated in box #39.
 
Once this presidential/congressional approval has been obtained, several
 
alternate launch sites could be selected (#60) and a set of draft specific
 
EIS's could be prepared by NASA on the following subjects:
 
0 Launch site (#61)
 
* Payload preparation and transportation (#62)
 
* Shuttle High level waste operations (#63)
 
0 Recovery System (#64)
 
These draft EIS's would be reviewed through the normal NEPA process. This pro­
cess includes review by many contributing agencies and coordination by the
 
President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). The chart emphasizes NRC's
 
importance in this process (#65, 66, 67, 68) because additional informal NRC
 
reviews may be desirable during the preparation of these draft EISs since NRC
 
is the licensing agency.
 
As part of the EIS process, comments on the draft EISs will be received.
 
Some of these comments may indicate problems whose solution may require design
 
changes. These changes are incorporated into the design to produce final de­
signs (#69, 70, 71, 72). These final designs are included in the final EIS
 
(#73, 74, 75, 76). A somewhat conceptually simpler approach could be used for
 
the space specific EISs on launch site, payload preparation and transportation,
 
operations and recovery system. These could be combined into a single EIS
 
which would significantly reduce the number of drafts, reviews, hearings, etc.
 
However, this reduction would be adcompanied by an increase in complexity for
 
each draft, review hearings, etc. NASA would have to make a judgment on the
 
relative merits of these distinct approaches. If the latter approach were
 
taken, then the EIS on the Space Isolation system (#40) would be a duplication
 
of effort and would be eliminated.
 
Upon completion of the space system set of specific EISs, NASA could
 
apply to NRC for construction permits for the launch sites (#77) and the pay­
load preparahion and transportation system (#78). It is not clear whether NRC
 
can require NASA to apply for these construction permits under the current
 
law. NASA may be legally allowed to construct these facilities without these
 
licenses (Ref. 4, pg. 25). Furthermore, once they areconstructed NASA may be
 
able to operate some of these facilities (#89, 90) without an NRC operating
 
license (#85, 86) since the waste is of military origin.
 
Returning to the lower -right corner of the chart to the EISs on Shuttle
 
Transportation System (STS) HLW operations (#75) and the recovery system (#76),
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the chart shows that NRC demonstration permits (#79, 80) are obtained prior to
 
cold testing, i.e., demonstrating the STS operations system and the simulated
 
HLW package recovery system. Prior to the actual demonstrations, the scope of
 
the denonstrations (#84) would presumably be agreed upon by'DOE/NASA/NRC. Whe­
ther actual recovery of simulated waste packages would be required from both
 
the deep ocean floor and also from an imperfect 0.86 AU heliocentric orbit is
 
not clear at this time. Following these "cold test" demonstrations, NRC opera­
ting licenses are obtained for operation of both the Shuttle HLW system (#87)
 
and the recovery system (#88). With the delivery of the portion of the mili­
tary HLW that is to be sent to space (#32), the complete demonstrations could
 
be completed in 1999. If this occurred, the NASA/DOE system for space augmen­
tation of selected components of military high-level waste could be operation­
al in the year 2,000.
 
3.4 SUMMARY OF LOGIC
 
The approach described above for space augmentation of military HLW dis­
posal allows for major funding decision points on 1980, 1983, 1984, 1987. The
 
assumption has been made that the geologic HLW disposal program proceeds in
 
parallel with the space disposal program. If progress on geologic disposal of
 
HLW is sufficiently promising, then there are several logical decisions points
 
at which the emphasis on space disposal can be decreased. On the other hand,
 
if serious delays are encountered in the geologic disposal program, the space
 
option could be accelerated at these decision nodes. Thus, the approach pre­
sented here provides the decision makers with adequate flexibility.
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